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Abstract. At CRYPTO 2017, Bela¨ıd et al. presented two new private multiplication algo-
rithms over finite fields, to be used in secure masking schemes. To date, these algorithms
have the lowest known complexity in terms of bilinear multiplication and random masks
respectively, both being linear in the number of shares d + 1. Yet, a practical drawback of
both algorithms is that their safe instantiation relies on finding matrices satisfying certain
conditions. In their work, Bela¨ıd et al. only address these up to d = 2 and 3 for the first and
second algorithm respectively, limiting so far the practical usefulness of their schemes.
In this paper, we use in turn an algebraic, heuristic, and experimental approach to find many
more safe instances of Bela¨ıd et al.’s algorithms. This results in explicit such instantiations
up to order d = 6 over large fields, and up to d = 4 over practically relevant fields such as
F28 .
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1 Introduction
It has become a well-accepted fact that the black-box security of a cryptographic scheme
and the security of one of its real-life implementations may be two quite different matters.
In the latter case, numerous side-channels or fault injection techniques may be used to
aid in the cryptanalysis of what could otherwise be a very sensible design (for instance
a provably-secure mode of operation on top of a block cipher with no known dedicated
attacks).
A successful line of side-channel attacks is based on the idea of differential power anal-
ysis (DPA), which was introduced by Kocher, Jaffe and Jun at CRYPTO’99 [KJJ99]. The
practical importance of this threat immediately triggered an effort from cryptographers to
find adequate protections. One of the notable resulting counter-measures is the masking
approach from Chari et al. and Goubin & Patarin [CJRR99,GP99]. The central idea of
this counter-measure is to add a “mask” to sensitive variables whose observation through
a side-channel could otherwise leak secret information; such variables for instance consist
of intermediate values in a block cipher computation that depend on a known plaintext
and a round key. Masking schemes apply a secret-sharing technique to several masked
instances of every sensitive variable: a legitimate user knowing all the shares can easily
compute the original value, while an adversary is now forced to observe more than one
value in order to learn anything secret. The utility of this overall approach is that it is
experimentally the case that the work required to observe n values accurately through
DPA increases exponentially with n.
The challenge in masking countermeasures is to find efficient ways to compute with
shared masked data while maintaining the property that the observation of n intermediate
values is necessary to learn a secret (for some parameter n). When computations are speci-
fied as arithmetic circuits over a finite field Fq, this task reduces mostly to the specification
of secure shared addition and multiplication in that field. A simple and commonly used
secret sharing scheme used in masking is the linear mapping x 7→
(
r1, . . . , rd, x+
∑d
i=1 ri
)
which makes addition trivial; the problem then becomes how to multiply shared values. At
CRYPTO 2003, Ishai, Sahai and Wagner introduced exactly such a shared multiplication
over F2, proven secure in a d-probing model that they introduced [ISW03]. Their scheme
requires d(d + 1)/2 random field elements (i.e. bits) and (d + 1)2 field multiplications to
protect against an adversary able to observe d intermediate values. This relatively high
quadratic complexity in the order d + 1 of the masking lead to an effort to decrease the
theoretical and/or practical cost of masking.
At EUROCRYPT 2016, Bela¨ıd et al. presented a masking scheme over F2 with random-
ness complexity decreased to d+d2/4; implementations at low but practically relevant or-
ders d ≤ 4 confirmed the gain offered by their new algorithm [BBP+16]. At CRYPTO 2017,
the same authors presented two new private multiplication algorithms over arbitrary finite
fields Fq [BBP
+17]. The first, Algorithm 4, decreases the number of bilinear multiplica-
tions to 2d+1 at the cost of additional constant multiplications and increased randomness
complexity compared to the algorithm of Ishai et al.; the second, Algorithm 5, decreases
the randomness complexity to only d, at the cost of d(d + 1) constant multiplications.
Furthermore, both algorithms are proven secure w.r.t. the strong, composable notions of
d-(strong) non-interference from Barthe et al. [BBD+16]. Yet a practical drawback of these
last two algorithms is that their safe instantiation depends on finding matrices satisfying
a certain number of conditions. Namely, Algorithm 4 uses two (related) matrices in Fd×dq
for an instantiation at order d + 1 over Fq, while Algorithm 5 uses a single matrix in
F
d+1×d
q for the same setting. In their paper, Bela¨ıd et al. only succeed in providing “safe
matrices” for the small cases d = 2 and d = 2, 3 for Algorithms 4 and 5 respectively, and
in giving a non-constructive existence theorem for safe matrices when q ≥ Q = O(d)d+1
(resp. q ≥ Q = O(d)d+2).
1.1 Our contribution
In this work, we focus on the problem of safely instantiating the two algorithms of Bela¨ıd
et al. from CRYPTO 2017. We first develop equivalent conditions which are in some sense
simpler and much more efficient to check computationally. We use this reformulation to
develop useful preconditions based on MDS matrices that increase the likelihood that a
given matrix is safe. We show how to generate matrices that satisfy our preconditions by
construction, which then allows to give an explicit sufficient condition, as well as a con-
struction of safe matrices for both schemes at order d ≤ 3. Our simplification of the matrix
conditions also naturally transforms into a testing algorithm, an efficient implementation
of which is used to perform an extensive experimental search. We provide explicit matrices
for safe instantiations in all of the following cases:
– For d = 3, fields F2k with k ≥ 3
– For d = 4, fields F2k with 5 ≤ k ≤ 16
– For d = 5, fields F2k with 10 ≤ k ≤ 16, and additionally k = 9 for Algorithm 5.
– For d = 6, fields F2k with 15 ≤ k ≤ 16
These are the first known instantiations for d ≥ 4 or for d = 3 over F23 . We also gather
detailed statistics about the proportion of safe matrices in all of these cases.
1.2 Roadmap
We recall the two masking schemes of CRYPTO 2017 and the associated matrix condi-
tions in Section 3. We give our simplifications of the latter in Section 4 and state our
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preconditions in Section 5. A formal analysis of the case of order up to 3 is given in
Section 6, where explicit conditions and instantiations for these orders are also developed.
We present our algorithms and discuss their implementations in Section 7, and conclude
with experimental results in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We use Km×n to denote the set of matrices with m rows and n columns over the field K.
We write m = rowdimA and n = coldimA. For any vector v, wt(v) denotes the Hamming
weight of v, i.e., the number of non-zero entries.
We use 0m×n (resp. 1m×n) to denote the all-zero (resp. all-one) matrix in K
m×n for
any fixed K (which will always be clear from the context). Similarly, Id is the identity
matrix of dimension d.
We generally use bold upper-case to denote matrices and bold lower-case to denote
vectors. (The exception is some lower-case Greek letters for matrices that have been already
defined in the literature, notably γ.) For a matrix M , Mi,j is the coefficient at the i
th
row and jth column, with numbering (usually) starting from one. (Again, γ will be an
exception as its row numbering starts at 0.) Similarly, a matrix may be directly defined
from its coefficients as
(
Mi,j
)
.
We use “hexadecimal notation” for binary field elements. This means that a =∑n−1
i=0 aiX
i ∈ F2n ∼= F2[X]/〈I(X)〉 (where I(X) is a degree-n irreducible polynomial)
is equated to the integer a˜ =
∑n−1
i=0 ai2
i, which is then written in base 16. The specific
field representations we use throughout are:
– F22 ∼= F2[x]/〈X
2 +X + 1〉;
– F23 ∼= F2[x]/〈X
3 +X + 1〉;
– F24 ∼= F2[x]/〈X
4 +X + 1〉;
– F25 ∼= F2[x]/〈X
5 +X2 + 1〉;
– F26 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
6 +X + 1〉;
– F27 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
7 +X + 1〉;
– F28 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
8 +X4 +X3 +X + 1〉;
– F29 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
9 +X + 1〉;
– F210 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
10 +X3 + 1〉;
– F211 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
11 +X2 + 1〉;
– F212 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
12 +X3 + 1〉;
– F213 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
13 +X4 +X3 +X + 1〉;
– F214 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
14 +X5 + 1〉;
– F215 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
15 +X + 1〉;
– F216 ∼= F2[X]/〈X
16 +X5 +X3 +X + 1〉.
Additional notation is introduced on first use.
2.2 MDS & Cauchy matrices
An [n, k, d]K linear code of length n, dimension k, minimum distance d over the field K is
maximum-distance separable (MDS) if it reaches the Singleton bound, i.e. if d = n−k+1.
An MDS matrix is the redundancy part A of a systematic generating matrix G =
(
Ik A
)
of a (linear) MDS code of length double its dimension.
A useful characterization of MDS matrices of particular interest in our case is stated
in the following theorem (see e.g. [MS06, Chap. 11, Thm. 8]):
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Theorem 1. A matrix is MDS if and only if all its minors are non-zero, i.e. all its square
sub-matrices are invertible.
Square Cauchy matrices satisfy the above condition by construction, and are thence
MDS. A (non-necessarily square) matrix A ∈ Kn×m is a Cauchy matrix if Ai,j = (xi −
yj)
−1, where {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym} are n+m distinct elements of K.
A Cauchy matrix A may be extended to a matrix A˜ by adding a row or a column of
ones. It can be shown that all square submatrices of A˜ are invertible, and thus themselves
MDS [RS85]. By analogy and by a slight abuse of terminology, we will say of a square
matrix A that it is extended MDS (XMDS) if all square submatrices of A extended by one
row or column of ones are MDS. Further depending on the context, we may only require
this property to hold for row (or column) extension to call a matrix XMDS.
A (possibly extended) Cauchy matrix A may be generalized to a matrix A′ by multi-
plying it with (non-zero) row and column scaling: one has A′i,j = cidj ·(xi−yj)
−1, cidj 6= 0.
All square submatrices of generalized (extended) Cauchy matrices are MDS [RS85], but
not necessarily XMDS, as one may already use the scaling to set any row or column of A′
to an arbitrary value.
2.3 Security notions for masking schemes
We recall the security notions under which the masking schemes studied in this paper were
analysed. These are namely d-non-interference (d-NI) and d-strong non-interference (d-
SNI), which were both introduced by Barthe et al. [BBD+16] as stronger and composable
alternatives to the original d-probing model of Ishai et al. [ISW03].
Note that none of the notions presented below are explicitly used in this paper, and
we only present them for the sake of completeness. Our exposition is strongly based on
the one of Bela¨ıd et al. [BBP+17].
Definition 2 (Gadgets). Let f : Kn → Km, u, v ∈ N; a (u, v)-gadget for the function
f is a randomized circuit C such that for every tuple (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ (K
u)n and every set
of random coins R, (y1, . . . ,ym)← [ C (x1, . . . ,xn;R) satisfies: v∑
j=1
y1,j, . . . ,
v∑
j=1
ym,j
 = f
 u∑
j=1
x1,j, . . . ,
u∑
j=1
xm,j
 .
One further defines xi as
∑u
j=1 xi,j, and similarly for yi; xi,j is called the j
th share of xi.
In the above, the randomized circuit C has access to random-scalar gates that generate
elements of K independently and uniformly at random, and the variable R records the
generated values for a given execution. Furthermore, one calls probes any subset of the
wires of C (or equivalently edges of its associated graph).
Definition 3 (t-Simulability). Let C be a (u, v)-gadget for f : Kn → Kn, and ℓ, t ∈ N.
A set {p1, . . . , pℓ} of probes of C is said to be t-simulable if ∃ I1, . . . , In ⊆ {1, . . . , u}; #Ii ≤
t and a randomized function π : (Kt)n → Kℓ such that for any (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ (K
u)n,
{p1, . . . , pℓ} ∼ {π({x1,i, i ∈ I1}, . . . , {xn,i, i ∈ In})}.
This notion of simulability leads to the following.
Definition 4 (d-Non-interference). A (u, v)-gadget C for a function over Kn is d-
non-interfering (or d-NI) if and only if any set of at most d probes of C is t-simulable,
t ≤ d.
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Definition 5 (d-Strong non-interference). A (u, v)-gadget C for a function over Kn
is d-strong non-interfering (or d-SNI) if and only if for every set P1 of at most d1 internal
probes (that do not depend on “output wires” or output shares yi,j’s) and every set P2
of d2 external probes (on output wires or shares) such that d1 + d2 ≤ d, then P1 ∪ P2 is
d1-simulable.
It is clear that a d-SNI gadget is also d-NI. Barthe et al. also showed that the two
notions were not equivalent, but that the composition of a d-NI and a d-SNI gadget was
d-SNI [BBD+16].
3 The masking schemes of CRYPTO 2017
We recall here the main ideas of the two masking schemes of Bela¨ıd et al. introduced at
CRYPTO 2017 [BBP+17] and their associated matrix conditions; we refer to that paper
for a full description of the gadgets and algorithms.
3.1 Masking with a linear number of bilinear multiplications [BBP+17, §4]
This scheme is the composition of two gadgets, only the first of which is of interest to
us. In order to build a d-SNI multiplication gadget with d + 1 input and output shares,
Bela¨ıd et al. first give a d-NI gadget with d+ 1 input and 2d+ 1 output shares, and then
compress its output into d+ 1 shares using a d-SNI gadget from Carlet et al. [CPRR16].
To implement d-NI multiplication over a field K, the first gadget needs a certain ma-
trix γ ∈ Kd×d; in turn, this defines a related matrix δ ∈ Kd×d as δ = 1d×d − γ. The
multiplication algorithm is then derived from the equality:
a · b =
(
a0 +
d∑
i=1
(ri + ai)
)
·
(
b0 +
d∑
i=1
(si + bi)
)
−
d∑
i=1
ri ·
b0 + d∑
j=1
(δi,jsj + bj)
− d∑
i=1
si ·
a0 + d∑
j=1
(γi,jrj + aj)
 ,
where a =
∑d
i=0 ai, b =
∑d
i=0 bi are the shared multiplicands, and the ris and sis are
arbitrary (a priori random) values. This equality leads to defining the output shares of
this first gadget as:
– c0 :=
(
a0 +
∑d
i=1(ri + ai)
)
·
(
b0 +
∑d
i=1(si + bi)
)
;
– ci := −ri ·
(
b0 +
∑d
j=1(δi,jsj + bj)
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ d;
– ci+d := −si ·
(
b0 +
∑d
j=1(γi,jsj + bj)
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
By considering a proper scheduling of the operations needed to compute the above
shares and the probes that this makes available to the adversary, Bela¨ıd et al. show that
a necessary and sufficient condition for their resulting scheme to be d-SNI is that γ and δ
both satisfy a certain condition, stated below.
Condition 4.1 ([BBP+17]). Let γ ∈ Kd×d; ℓ = 2d2+4d+1;Dγ,j ∈ K
d×d be the diagonal
matrix whose non-zero entry at row i is equal to γj,i; Td ∈ K
d×d be the upper-triangular
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matrix whose non-zero entries are all one; and Tγ,j ∈ K
d×d =Dγ,jTd. Equivalently:
Id =

1 0 · · · 0
0 1 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1
 , Dγ,j =

γj,1 0 · · · 0
0 γj,2 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 γj,d
 ,
Td =

1 1 · · · 1
0 1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1
 , Tγ,j =

γj,1 γj,1 · · · γj,1
0 γj,2 · · · γj,2
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 γj,d
 .
One then defines L ∈ K(d+1)×ℓ and Mγ ∈ K
d×ℓ as:
L =
(
1
0d×1
01×d
Id
01×d
0d×d
01×d
Id
01×d
Id
· · ·
01×d
Id
11×d
Td
11×d
Td
· · ·
11×d
Td
)
,
Mγ = ( 0d×1 0d×d Id Id Dγ,1 · · · Dγ,d Td Tγ,1 · · · Tγ,d ).
Finally, γ is said to satisfy Condition 4.1 if for any vector v ∈ Kℓ of Hamming weight
wt(v) ≤ d such that Lv contains no zero coefficient ( i.e. is of maximum Hamming weight
d+ 1), then Mγv 6= 0d×1.
An equivalent, somewhat more convenient formulation of Condition 4.1 can be obtained
by contraposition: γ satisfies Condition 4.1 if
v ∈ ker(Mγ) ∧ wt(v) ≤ d⇒ wt(Lv) < d+ 1. (1)
Whichever formulation is adopted, the logic behind this condition is that a violation of the
implication means that there exists a linear combination of at most d probes that depends
on all the input shares (as Lv is of full weight) and on no random mask (asMγv = 0d×1).
In that respect, L and M behave as “indicator matrices” for the shares and masks on
which depend individual probes.
3.2 Masking with linear randomness complexity [BBP+17, §5]
The second scheme that we consider is defined by a single d-NI multiplication gadget
over K that has (d + 1) input and output shares. An instantiation depends on a matrix
γ ∈ K(d+1)×d whose rows sum to zero, i.e., such that
∑d
i=0 γi = 01×d.
‡ This lets us defining
the output shares as:
– ci = a0bi +
∑d
j=1(γi,jrj + ajbi), 0 ≤ i ≤ d,
where again a =
∑d
i=0 ai, b =
∑d
i=0 bi are the shared multiplicands and the ris are arbitrary
values.
Bela¨ıd et al. show that a necessary and sufficient condition for their resulting gadget
to be d-NI is that γ satisfies a condition similar to Condition 4.1, stated below.
‡Note that for convenience in the subsequent share definitions and consistency with the notation
of [BBP+17], the row index of γ starts from zero and not one.
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Condition 5.1 ([BBP+17]). Let γ ∈ K(d+1)×d ℓ, Dγ,j, Td, Tγ,j be as in Condition 4.1
and K(ω0, . . . , ωd) be the field of rational fractions over indeterminates ω0, . . . , ωd. One
defines L′ ∈ K(ω0, . . . , ωd)
(d+1)×ℓ and M ′γ ∈ K
d×ℓ as:
L′ =
(
1
0d×1
01×d
Id
01×d
0d×d
01×d
ω0Id
01×d
ω1Id
· · ·
01×d
ωdId
ω011×d
ω0Td
ω111×d
ω1Td
· · ·
ωd11×d
ωdTd
)
,
M ′γ = ( 0d×1 0d×d Id Dγ,0 Dγ,1 · · · Dγ,d Tγ,0 Tγ,1 · · · Tγ,d ).
Then γ is said to satisfy Condition 5.1 if for any vector v ∈ Kℓ of Hamming weight
wt(v) ≤ d such that L′v contains no zero coefficient, then M ′γv 6= 0d×1.
Note that as K is a subfield of K(ω0, . . . , ωd) (viz. the field of its constants), the product
L′v is well-defined. Also, again by contraposition, Condition 5.1 can be expressed as:
v ∈ ker(M ′γ) ∧ wt(v) ≤ d⇒ wt(L
′v) < d+ 1. (2)
4 Simplifying and unifying the conditions
In this section, we describe a few simplifications and consolidations of the correctness and
safety for the two schemes described in the previous section. These simplifications are
important for our analytical and algorithmic results, and the consolidations of the two
schemes allow for ease in presentation.
Specifically, we develop three related conditions C, C′, and C′′, on the matricesMγ , Ld,
M ′γ , and L
′
d defined in Conditions 4.1 and 5.1, such that the safety of the masking schemes
is guaranteed when these conditions are true. We prove that the first condition C and
the third condition C′′ are both exactly equivalent to the requirements of Conditions 4.1
and 5.1. The second condition C′ is always a sufficient condition as it implies the other
two, and it is also necessary under a very mild condition on the field size.
4.1 Unifying Mγ and M
′
γ
Recall the definitions of matrices Mγ from Condition 4.1 and M
′
γ from Condition 5.1.
These are both d × ℓ matrices (where ℓ = 2d2 + 4d + 1) consisting of zeros, ones, and
entries from γ. Moreover, Mγ and M
′
γ are exactly the same except for in one submatrix
of d columns: this submatrix is Td in Mγ and Tγ,0 in M
′
γ .
We can unify these two matrices by considering, in the case of Condition 4.1, augment-
ing the γ matrix with an additional row of 1’s at index 0. Then Td = Tγ,0 and we can
consider only the second form of the matrix M ′γ .
Note that the corresponding matrices Lγ and L
′
γ from Conditions 4.1 and 5.1 respec-
tively are still not identical, but the locations of non-zero entries (i.e., the support) in Lγ
and L′γ are the same.
Now for both schemes, there is a single matrix γ ∈ K(d+1)×d which determines their
correctness (do the output shares always correspond to the multiplication of the input
value) and safety (is it possible for an attacker to learn any secrets with at most d probes).
To succinctly state the unified condition, we first define a simple predicate Z for when
a matrix X ∈ Km×n (or column vector x ∈ Km) has at least one row of zeros:
Z(X) := ∃ i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} s.t. ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , n},Xi,j = 0.
7
Based on the above discussion, we define the following crucial predicate for the safety
definition for two arbitrary matrices A and B with the same number of columns:
C(A,B) := ∀ v ∈ ker(A) s.t. wt(v) ≤ rowdim(A), then Z(Bv). (3)
Typically we will have A =M ′γ and B is either L or L
′.
Now we can restate the correctness and safety conditions for the two schemes. The
following propositions follow directly from the definitions and discussions so far.
Proposition 6. For γ ∈ K(d+1)×d, the scheme of Section 3.1 is correct and safe if and
only if the following conditions are met, where δ =
(
21×d
§
1d×d
)
− γ:
(1) γ0,j = 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , d}
(2) C(M ′γ ,L)
(3) C(M ′δ,L)
Proposition 7. For γ ∈ K(d+1)×d, the scheme of Section 3.2 is correct and safe if and
only if the following conditions are met:
(1)
∑d
i=0 γi = 01×d
(2) C(M ′γ ,L
′)
4.2 Equivalent condition with kernel bases
Next we develop a condition similar to the definition of C(A,B) as defined in (3) above,
but in terms of kernel bases rather than individual vectors. This modified condition is
equivalent under a mild requirement on the size of the field K.
The general idea is that rather than considering all matrix-vector products Bv, where
v is a d-sparse vector in the right kernel of A, we consider instead the kernel basis for
a size-d subset of A’s columns, and multiply the corresponding columns in B times this
basis. Specifying this condition requires some additional notation which will also be useful
later on.
Let kerb(X) denote a basis of the right kernel of X. That is, any vector v ∈ ker(X)
is a linear combination of the columns of kerb(X).
Let [c1, . . . , ck] be a list of k distinct column indices, where each 1 ≤ ci ≤ ℓ. Selecting
only these columns from any matrix with ℓ columns is a linear operator corresponding to
a selection matrix P ∈ {0, 1}ℓ×k , where Pi,j = 1 iff cj = i. Define S
ℓ
m as the set of all ℓ×m
selection matrices. That is, S ℓm consists of all {0, 1}-matrices with ℓ rows and at most m
columns, where there is a single 1 in each column and no two 1s in the same row.
Note that the product of a selection matrix and its transpose is an identity matrix
with some rows and columns set to zero. For any matrix (or vector) X ∈ Km×n with at
most k non-zero rows, there is a selection matrix P ∈ Skm such that PP
TX =X.
The equivalent condition to (3) that we consider now is formed by multiplying some
subset of B’s columns times a kernel basis of the same subset of A’s columns:
C′(A,B) := ∀P ∈ S ℓrowdim(A), Z(BP · kerb(AP )). (4)
One direction of the equivalence is straightforward, and the other depends on the
Schwartz-Zippel lemma and therefore on the size of the field. Even so, the field size re-
quirement here is very mild; indeed the field is sufficiently large in all cases where we are
aware of any valid constructions of the schemes.
§In fields of characteristic 2, the matrix 21×d is actually 01×d.
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Theorem 8. For any A ∈ Kn×ℓ and B ∈ Km×ℓ, we have C′(A,B)⇒ C(A,B). If K has
at least m+ 1 distinct elements, then C′(A,B)⇐ C(A,B) also.
Proof. We begin with the “⇒” direction.
Let v be a vector satisfying the conditions of C(A,B); that is, v ∈ kerA and wt(v) ≤
rowdim(A). The latter fact means that there exists P ∈ S ℓrowdim(A) such that PP
Tv = v.
Because Av = 0, we then have (AP )(P Tv) = 0, which means that the vector P Tv
is a linear combination of the columns of kerb(AP ).
The condition C(A,B) concerns the matrix-vector productBv, which equalsBPP Tv.
From above, we know that this is a linear combination of the columns in the matrix
BP · kerb(AP ). By the assumption that C′(A,B), this matrix contains a zero row, and
therefore any linear combination of its columns also contains a zero row; hence Z(Bv).
For the “⇐” direction, we prove using the contrapositive. Assume there exists some
selection of columns P ∈ S ℓn such that ¬Z(BP · kerb(AP )). We need to show that
¬C(A,B).
Suppose the column dimension of kerb(AP ) (i.e., the nullity of AP ) is k, and let
x be a column vector of k indeterminates x1, . . . , xk. Now consider the matrix-vector
product BP · kerb(AP ) ·x. This is a column vector of dimension m consisting of degree-
1 polynomials in the k indeterminates. Furthermore, none of these polynomials is zero
because of the assumption ¬Z(BP · kerb(AP )).
The product of them polynomials in BP ·kerb(AP ) ·x is a single non-zero polynomial
in k variables with total degree m. By the Schwartz-Zippel-DeMillo-Lipton lemma [Sch80,
Cor. 1], and because #K > m, there must exist some assignment of the k variables to
values in K such that this product polynomial is non-zero. That is, there exists some
column vector w ∈ Kk such that wt(BP · kerb(AP ) ·w) = m.
Because kerb(AP ) · w ∈ Kn, there is an n-sparse vector v ∈ Kℓ such that P Tv =
kerb(AP ) · w. This vector v shows that C(A,B) is false. Namely, v ∈ ker(A) because
Av = (AP )(P Tv) = 0; it has low weight wt(v) ≤ n; and Bv = (BP )(P Tv) is of full
weight m from the previous paragraph. ⊓⊔
4.3 Eliminating rows and columns
The third simplification to the correctness and safety conditions of the two masking
schemes that we develop is an equivalent condition to C(M ′γ ,N) that depends on less than
half of the columns in the original matrices. The intuition is that most of the columns of
these matrices have weight 1, and thus those probes in the masking scheme do not gain
the attacker any real advantage. So we can focus on only the parts of M ′γ and N whose
columns have weight greater than 1. We first develop some new terminology to talk about
these submatrices, then prove a lemma which shows how to eliminate columns from γ cor-
responding to the weight-one probes, and finally state and prove the equivalent condition
C′′.
So far the schemes are both defined by a matrix γ with d+ 1 rows and d columns. In
fact, the definitions of matricesMγ ,M
′
γ , L, and L
′ from Conditions 4.1 and 5.1 generalize
to any rectangular matrix γ ∈ K(d+1)×n. If γ has d + 1 rows and n columns, then Mγ
and M ′γ both have n rows, while Ln and L
′
n have n+ 1 rows, and all four matrices have
ℓn = 2dn+ 4n+ 1 columns.
We focus on the bottom-right n× (dn+ n) submatrix of each M ′γ , Ln and L
′
n, which
we call the “triangular part” of each. Formally, we define a linear operator ∆ such that,
for any matrix A with n or n + 1 rows and 2nd + 4d + 1 columns, ∆(A) consists of the
bottom-right n× (dn+ n) submatrix of A.
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In summary, we have:
Ln =
(
1
0n×1
01×n
In
01×n
0n×n
01×n
In
01×n
In
· · ·
01×n
In
11×n
Tn
11×n
Tn
· · ·
11×n
Tn
)
,
L′n =
(
1
0n×1
01×n
In
01×n
0n×n
01×n
ω0In
01×n
ω1In
· · ·
01×n
ωdIn
ω011×n
ω0Tn
ω111×n
ω1Tn
· · ·
ωd11×n
ωdTn
)
,
M ′γ = ( 0n×1 0n×n In Dγ,0 Dγ,1 · · · Dγ,d Tγ,0 Tγ,1 · · · Tγ,d ).
∆(Ln)
∆(L′n)
∆(M ′γ)
Notice that the matrices Ln and L
′
n have some different entries but the same non-
zero locations or support ; for convenience we denote by Nn any matrix with this same
dimension and support.
Inspecting the definition ofM ′γ , we see that rows of this matrix correspond to columns
of γ, and removing the ith column of γ corresponds to removing a single row and 2d+ 4
columns from each of M ′γ and N .
Notice also that the columns ofM ′γ and of Ln which are not in the triangular parts all
have weight at most one. This means, as we show in the following technical lemma, that
the effect of any such column choice can be eliminated by removing one row each from
M ′γ and Ln. In terms of masking schemes, this means that a single probe corresponding
to these non-triangular parts allows the adversary to cancel at most one random value and
to learn at most one share. Because the number of shares is d+ 1 in a scheme allowing d
probes, this results in no advantage for the adversary.
Lemma 9. Let γ ∈ K(d+1)×n, M ′γ and Nn be as above. Suppose u ∈ K
ℓn is a vector with
wt(u) = 1 whose single non-zero entry is between index 2 and dn+ 3n+ 1 inclusive, and
v ∈ Kℓn is any other vector. Then there exists a selection matrix P ∈ Snn−1 and another
vector w ∈ Kℓn−1 with wt(w) ≤ wt(v) such that
wt(M ′γPw) ≤ wt(M
′
γ(u+ v)) and wt(Nn−1w) ≥ wt(Nn(u+ v))− 1.
Proof. Write i for the index of the non-zero entry in u. We can see that the ith column
of M ′γ and Nn both have weight at most one. Indeed, for each i ∈ {2, . . . , dn + 3n + 1},
there is a corresponding index j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that the ith columns of M ′γ and Nn
are zero everywhere except possibly in row j (provided that we continue to index the rows
of Nn starting at 0).
Removing the jth row fromM ′γ andNn results in two new matricesA,B (respectively)
whose ith columns are both zero, and hence Au = 0 and Bu = 0. This means that
wt(Av) = wt(A(u+ v)) ≤ wt(M ′γ(u+ v))
wt(Bv) = wt(B(u+ v)) ≥ wt(Nn(u+ v))− 1.
Write P ∈ Snn−1 as the matrix which selects all n columns of γ except for the jth
column. Now A and B are the same as M ′γP and Nn−1 respectively, except that they
each have 2d+4 extra columns. The remaining task is to modify v so that it is zero at all
the indices corresponding to these extra columns, without changing wt(Av) or wt(Bv).
We can see that d+3 of these extra columns come from the first dn+3n+1 columns of
M ′γ and Nn and, since the jth row has been removed, they are in fact now zero columns.
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So letting v′ be the same as v with any such entries set to zero, we do not change the
products Av′ or Bv′ at all.
The d+1 remaining extra columns come from the triangular parts∆(M ′γ) and∆(Nn).
There are now two cases to consider. First, if j = 1, i.e., we have removed the second row
of Nn and the first row of M
′
γ . Then these extra columns from the triangular part of A
are all zero columns, and from B they have the form (a 0 · · · 0)T for some non-zero entry
a in the first row of Nn. Upon inspection, we see that these columns are exactly a times
the very first columns of A and B respectively. Therefore we can modify the vector v′ to
a new vector v′′, where any non-zero entries in such positions are divided by a and added
to the first entry, then set to zero. This does not change the value of Av′′ or Bv′′.
The second case is that j ≥ 2, i.e., we have removed a later row. Then the extra
columns in A and B are exactly identical to the columns immediately to their left in the
respective matrices. So we can form v′′ in this case by adding any non-zero entry of v′ in
such positions to the adjacent position and then setting it to zero, without changing Av′′
or Bv′′.
After this, we have a vector v′′ with wt(v′′) ≤ wt(v), and with zeros in all of the
“extra column” indices of A and B, such that wt(Av′′) ≤ wt(M ′γ(u+v)) and wt(Bv
′′) ≥
wt(Nn(u+ v))− 1. Finally, setting w to be the sub-vector of v
′′ with these extra column
entries removed completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Repeated application of the previous lemma allows us to completely eliminate all of the
columns inM ′γ and Nn other than the triangular parts, at the cost of having to consider
all possible column-subsets of γ itself. This leads to the following condition:
C′′(M ′γ ,Nn) := ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . , n},∀P ∈ S
n
k , C(∆(M
′
γP ),∆(Nk)). (5)
In other words, we restrict our attention to only square submatrices of the triangular parts
of M ′γ and Nn. As it turns out, this condition is exactly equivalent to the original one.
Theorem 10. For any field K, matrix γ ∈ K(d+1)×n where n ≥ 1, and matrix Nn ∈
{Ln,L
′
n}, we have C
′′(M ′γ ,Nn)⇔ C(M
′
γ ,Nn).
Proof. We prove the equivalent double negation ¬C(M ′γ ,Nn)⇔ ¬C
′′(M ′γ ,Nn).
First we prove the “⇒” direction by induction on n. Assuming that ¬C(M ′γ ,Nn)
means there exists a vector v ∈ Kℓn such that wt(v) ≤ n, M ′γv = 0, and Nnv has full
weight n+ 1.
For the base case, let n = 1. Because wt(v) = 1 and wt(Nnv) = 2, the lone non-zero
entry of v must correspond to a weight-2 column in Nn, and the only such columns are
in the triangular part. So considering the vector formed from the last d + 1 entries of v
shows that ¬C(∆(M ′γ),∆(Nn)), which is equivalent to ¬C
′′(M ′γ ,Nn) when n = 1.
Now for the induction case, let n ≥ 2 and assume the ⇒ direction is true for all
size-(n − 1) subsets of columns of γ.
Again we start with a vector v which is a counterexample to C(M ′γ ,Nn). If v has any
non-zero entry in indices 2 through dn+3n+1, then we can isolate that entry in its own
vector u and write v = u+ v∗, where wt(v∗) = wt(v) − 1 ≤ n − 1. Now apply Lemma 9
to obtain a vector w ∈ Kℓn−1 and a selection matrix P ∈ Snn−1 such that wt(w) ≤ n − 1,
M ′γPw = 0, and wt(Nn−1w) = n − 1. Therefore ¬C(M
′
γP ,Nn−1), so we can apply the
induction hypothesis to complete this sub-case.
Otherwise, the non-zero entries of v are in the very first index, or in the last (d+ 1)n
indices which correspond to the triangular parts. But the first columns of Nn andM
′
γ are
all zeros except for the first row in Nn, which is eliminated in the triangular part ∆(Nn).
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Therefore, if this entry of v is non-zero, we can change it to zero without affecting M ′γv,
which must equal 0, or the last n rows of Nnv, which must be all non-zero. Hence the
vector consisting of the last (d+1)n entries of v is a counterexample to C(∆(M ′γ),∆(Nn)).
This completes the ⇒ direction of the proof.
For the ⇐ direction, assume that ¬C′′(M ′γ ,Nn). This means there is some k ∈
{1, . . . , n}, some selection of columns from γ defined by P ∈ Snk , and some v ∈ K
ℓk
such that wt(v) ≤ k, ∆(M ′γP )v = 0, and ∆(Nk)v has full weight k.
Because the triangular part is a subset of the whole, we can prepend v with dk+3k+1
zeros to obtain a vector v′ such thatM ′γPv
′ = 0 and Nkv
′ is non-zero everywhere except
possibly in the first row. Observe that the row of Nk immediately above the triangular
part is exactly identical to the top row of ∆(Nk), so in fact Nkv
′ has full weight k + 1.
This shows that there exists at least one k ≥ 1 such that there exists a selection
P ∈ Snk and a vector v
′ which is a counterexample to C(M ′γP ,Nk). Assume now that k
is the largest such integer.
If k = n, then M ′γP =M
′
γ , and v
′ is a counterexample to C(M ′γ ,Nn) already.
Otherwise, if k < n, we show that we can construct a larger selection matrix Q and
corresponding vector w satisfying the conditions above, which is a contradiction to the
assumption that k is the largest such value.
Construct another selection matrix Q ∈ Snk+1 consisting of the columns selected by P
plus some additional column i; for convenience write ζ = γQ. Note that M ′γP and Nk
are submatrices of M ′ζ and Nk+1 respectively, the latter both having exactly one more
row and some number of extra columns. Therefore by extending v′ to a larger vector
v′′ by inserting zeros in the locations of these extra columns, we have that M ′ζv
′′ is zero
everywhere except possibly at index i, andNk+1v
′′ is non-zero everywhere except at index
i. Let a be the ith entry of M ′ζv
′′ and b be the ith entry of Nk+1v
′′.
Finally, we show how to add one more entry to v′′ to “fix” the exceptions at index i
in the previous sentence, making a = 0 and b 6= 0. There are four cases to consider:
1. If a = 0 and b 6= 0, then we are done.
2. If a = 0 and b = 0, then set the (i+1)th entry of v to 1; this corresponds to a column
of zeros in M ′ζ and a column of the identity matrix in Nk+1. So adding that column
keeps a = 0 but sets b to 1.
3. If a 6= 0 and b 6= 0, then set the (k+ i+1)th entry of v to −a. This entry corresponds
to a column of the identity matrix inM ′ζ and a column of zeros in Nk+1, so adding it
keeps b 6= 0 but cancels the value of a.
4. If a 6= 0 and b = 0, then set the (2k + i + 2)th entry of v to −a/ζ0,i. This entry
corresponds to a column of Dζ,0 inM
′
ζ , and a column of either Ik+1 or ω0Ik+1 within
Nk+1, and therefore the change to v cancels out a and sets b to some non-zero value.
This newly constructed vector has weight at most wt(v′′) + 1 ≤ k + 1, and is therefore
a counterexample to C(M ′ζ ,Nk+1). This is a contradiction to the assumption that k was
maximal, which completes the ⇐ direction and the entire proof. ⊓⊔
5 An MDS precondition
We use the results of the previous two sections to develop a useful precondition for gener-
ating γ matrices which satisfy the safety and correctness conditions of the two schemes.
This precondition guarantees the correctness conditions, and (as we will see in later sec-
tions) seems to raise the probability of a matrix satisfying the safety condition. We then
show how to explicitly generate matrices which satisfy these preconditions.
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5.1 Preconditions intuition and definition
As in the previous section, let γ ∈ K(d+1)×d be a matrix whose entries determine the
correctness and safety of one of the two masking schemes according to Proposition 6 or
Proposition 7. (Either γ must have a row of 1’s for the masking scheme with linear bilinear
multiplications, or the columns of γ must sum to 0 for the scheme with linear randomness.)
Then Theorems 8 and 10 tell us that a sufficient condition is that, for every square
submatrix of ∆(M ′γ), every vector in its right kernel results in at least one zero entry
when multiplied by a corresponding submatrix of ∆(Nd). The general idea of the MDS
precondition we describe next is to minimize the rank of this right kernel, effectively
limiting the number of possible “unsafe” vectors. In particular, when a square submatrix
of ∆(M ′γ) is non-singular, then its nullity is zero and the scheme is safe with respect to
that subset of rows and columns.
This suggests a strategy to increase the likelihood of a matrix leading to a safe scheme:
one may try to choose γ in a way that ensures that ∆(M ′γP )Q has a trivial kernel for as
many selection matrices P ∈ S dk and Q ∈ S
ℓk
k as possible. That is, square submatrices of
the triangular part of M ′γ should be non-singular as often as possible.
A good such choice for γ is to take it to be such that all its square submatrices are MDS.
To justify this claim, recall from Section 2 that any square submatrix of an MDS matrix
is invertible, i.e., has a trivial kernel. Further, from the definition of ∆(M ′γ), its columns
consist of (partial) rows of γ; therefore many of its submatrices are in fact (transposed)
submatrices of γ itself.
Example 11. Consider for the case d = 3, the submatrix of ∆(M ′γ) given by:
X =
γ0,1 γ1,1 γ2,10 γ1,2 γ2,2
0 γ1,3 γ2,3
 .
(Note that in the case of Condition 4.1, γ0,1 must equal 1.) If all square submatrices
of γ are MDS, the bottom-right 2 × 2 submatrix of X is necessarily non-singular, and
γ0,1 6= 0, so therefore this entire submatrix is non-singular. This would not be the case for
an arbitrary matrix γ, even if say, one takes it to be full-rank.
We now state our two preconditions on the matrices used to instantiate either masking
scheme. As will be clear in the remainder of this paper, these preconditions are by no
means sufficient, nor necessary. Yet we will also see, both formally (in Section 6) and
experimentally (in Section 8) how they may be useful.
Precondition 4.1. A matrix γ ∈ K(d+1)×d satisfies Precondition 4.1 for Condition 4.1 if
it can be written as γ =
(
11×d
A
)
, and both matrices A and 1d×d −A are row XMDS.
Any such matrix γ clearly satisfies the correctness condition, which is item (1) in
Proposition 6. The XMDS property also ensures that all square submatrices of γ and
δ are non-singular, which (we expect) will make the safety conditions (2) and (3) from
Proposition 6 more likely satisfied.
Precondition 5.1. A matrix γ ∈ K(d+1)×d satisfies Precondition 5.1 for Condition 5.1 if∑d
i=0 γi = 01×d and all of its square submatrices are MDS.
Again, this precondition guarantees the correctness of the scheme, corresponding to
item (1) of Proposition 7, and the non-singular submatrices make it (we expect) more
likely that the security condition, item (2), is also true.
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5.2 Explicit constructions satisfying the preconditions
It is relatively easy to check if a given matrix satisfies either of the above preconditions.
Here we do even better, providing a direct construction for families of matrices that satisfy
each precondition.
Theorem 12 (Satisfying Precondition 4.1). Let {x1, . . . , xd, y1, . . . , yd} ∈ K\{0} be
2d distinct non-zero elements of K, and define matrix A ∈ Kd×d by Ai,j = xi/(xi − yj).
Then the corresponding γ ∈ K(d+1)×d satisfies Precondition 4.1.
Proof. Define the row-extended Cauchy matrix B as B0,j = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ d; Bi,j = (xi −
yj)
−1, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d. The generalized extended matrix obtained from B by the row scaling
c =
(
1 x1 · · · xd
)
is equal to γ, and all its square submatrices are invertible by construction,
hence A is row XMDS.
The matrixC = 1d×d−A is given by
(
(xi − yj − xi) · (xi − yj)
−1
)
=
(
−yj · (xi − yj)
−1
)
.
It is a generalized Cauchy matrix with column scaling given by
(
−y1 . . . −yd
)T
, and is then
MDS. Because 0 /∈ {x1, . . . , xd, y1, . . . , yd}, one may extend C by one row on top using
x0 = 0, resulting in C
′ s.t. C′0,j = −yj · (0−yj)
−1 = 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ d; C′i,j = Ci,j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d.
In other words,
C′ =
(
11×d
C
)
is a generalized Cauchy matrix, whose square submatrices are all invertible by construction,
hence C = 1d×d −A is row XMDS. ⊓⊔
Theorem 13 (Satisfying Precondition 5.1). Let {x1, . . . , xd, xd+1, y1, . . . , yd} ∈ K be
2d+1 distinct elements of K; let A =
(
(xi − yj)
−1
)
; and let c =
(
c1 · · · cd+1
)
be a non-zero
vector in the left kernel of A. Then γ =
(
ci · (xi − yj)
−1
)
satisfies Precondition 5.1.
Proof. By construction, the d+1× d Cauchy matrix A has a left kernel of dimension one.
Furthermore, any vector of this kernel that is not the null vector is of full Hamming weight,
as being otherwise would imply the existence of k ≤ d linearly-dependent rows of A. The
row scaling coefficients
(
c1 · · · cd+1
)
are thus all non-zero, and the generalized Cauchy
matrix A′ is such that its rows sum to the null vector and all its square submatrices are
invertible. ⊓⊔
6 Analytic construction for order up to 3
In this section, we develop explicit polynomial conditions on the entries of generalized
Cauchy matrices that are sufficient to ensure both the correctness and safety of two schemes
described in Section 3.
The results are explicit constructions for many field sizes. For order d = 1, Corollary 15
proves that any non-zero γ matrix makes the scheme secure. For order d = 2, Corollary 16
proves that our MDS preconditions in the previous section always produce safe construc-
tions without the need for any further checks. Finally, for order d = 3, Theorems 19
and 21 provide xi and yi values to use in those MDS preconditions in order to generate
safe constructions for any field of characteristic 2 with q ≥ 4.
The idea behind our MDS preconditions in Section 5 was to ensure that all square
submatrices of γ are non-singular, and therefore many square submatrices of the matrix
∆(M ′γ) have nullity zero. For small dimensions, we can go further and actually require
that all submatrices of∆(M ′γ) are non-singular which could possibly violate the condition
C′′ from (5). This will in turn guarantee a safe and correct construction by Theorem 10
and Propositions 6 and 7.
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6.1 Columns which must be selected
Let γ ∈ K(d+1)×n and recall the definitions of ∆(Nn) and ∆(M
′
γ); in the former case we
show only the positions of the non-zero entries, which are the same whether Nn = Ln or
Nn = L
′
n.
∆(Nn) =

∗ ∗ · · · ∗ ∗ ∗ · · · ∗
· · ·
∗ ∗ · · · ∗  ,∗ · · · ∗ ∗ · · · ∗ ∗ · · · ∗. . . ... . . . ... . . . ...
∗ ∗ ∗
∆(M ′γ) =

γ0,1 γ0,1 · · · γ0,1 γ1,1 γ1,1 · · · γ1,1
· · ·
γd,1 γd,1 · · · γd,1
 .γ0,2 · · · γ0,2 γ1,2 · · · γ1,2 γd,2 · · · γd,2. . . ... . . . ... . . . ...
γ0,n γ1,n γd,n
Notice that all pairs of columns in M ′γ and Nn with the same index (hence corre-
sponding to the same probe in the masking scheme) have the same weight. The next
lemma shows that any unsafe set of probes from among these columns must include at
least two of the full-weight columns.
Lemma 14. Let γ ∈ K(d+1)×n,M ′γ ,Ln be as above. If γ has no zero entries, then any
column selection P ∈ S ℓnn which is a counterexample to C
′(∆(M ′γ),∆(Nn)) must include
at least two columns of full weight n from ∆(M ′γ) and ∆(Nn).
Proof. A counterexample to C′(∆(M ′γ),∆(Nn)) is a selection matrix P ∈ S
ℓn
n such that
the matrix product ∆(Nn)P · kerb(∆(M
′
γ)P ) has no zero rows.
The only columns of ∆(Nn) which are non-zero in the last row are those columns of
full weight, so at least one must be included in P for the product to have no zero rows.
But in order for∆(M ′γ)P to have a non-trivial kernel, it must have a second column with
a non-zero in the last row. ⊓⊔
6.2 Dimensions 1 and 2
Combined with the results of the prior sections, this leads immediately to solutions for
orders n = 1 or n = 2.
Corollary 15. For any γ ∈ K(d+1)×1 that contains no zero entries, we have C(M ′γ ,N1).
Proof. Clearly there is no way to include two full-weight columns in a selection P ∈ S ℓ11 of a
single column. Therefore from Lemma 14, we have ¬C′(∆(M ′γ),∆(N1)). By Theorems 8
and 10 this implies the statement above. ⊓⊔
Corollary 16. For any γ ∈ K(d+1)×2 such that all square submatrices of γ are MDS, we
have C(M ′γ ,N2).
Proof. Any selection of 2 columns of ∆(M ′γ) that includes at least 2 full-weight columns
is simply a transposed submatrix of γ of dimension 2. By Theorem 1, any such submatrix
is non-singular, and thus has a trivial kernel. Therefore by Lemma 14 there are no coun-
terexamples to C′(∆(M ′γ),∆(N2)), and by Theorems 8 and 10 again the stated result
follows. ⊓⊔
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Most notably, these corollaries guarantee that any matrix with column dimension 1 or
2 which satisfies Precondition 4.1 or Precondition 5.1 is an instantiation of the respective
masking scheme that is correct and safe. Because we have explicit constructions for these
preconditions in Theorems 12 and 13 over any field Fq with q > 2d + 1, we also have
explicit instantiations for the masking schemes secure against 1 or 2 probes.
6.3 Dimension 3
Next we turn to the case of n = 3. It is no longer possible to construct safe instances
of γ based on the MDS preconditions alone, but there is only one other shape of square
submatrices that need be considered.
Lemma 17. Let γ ∈ K(d+1)×3,M ′γ ,Ln be as above. If every square submatrix of γ is
MDS, and for all distinct triples of indices {i, j, k} ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , d+ 1} the matrixγi,1 γj,1 γk,1γi,2 γj,2 γk,2
γi,3 γj,3 0

is non-singular, then we have C(M ′γ ,N3).
Proof. The goal is to ensure that no square submatrix of ∆(M ′γ) which could possibly be
part of a counterexample to C′(∆(M ′γ),∆(N3)) has a non-trivial kernel. Already we know
from Lemma 14 that any such submatrix must include two distinct full-weight columns.
Because all square submatrices of γ are MDS, these two columns have a trivial kernel,
meaning a third column must be added if one hopes to find a counterexample. This leads
to three cases, depending on the weight of this third column.
If the third column has weight 1, the situation is analogous to that of Example 11.
The corresponding matrix is non-singular if and only if some 2 × 2 submatrix of γ is
non-singular, which it must be by the MDS assumption.
Next, if the third column has full weight 3, then we have a 3×3 submatrix of γ, which
again must be non-singular.
The remaining case is that the third column has weight 2, as in the statement of the
lemma. All that remains is to prove that this index k must be distinct from i and j. By
way of contradiction, and without loss of generality, suppose i = k. Then after subtracting
the third column from the first, we obtain the matrix 0 γj,1 γi,10 γj,2 γi,2
γi,3 γj,3 0
 ,
which is non-singular if and only if the original matrix is non-singular. And indeed, this
matrix must be non-singular because the upper-right 2× 2 matrix is a submatrix of γ.
Therefore the only remaining case of a submatrix which could be a counterexample
to C′(∆(M ′γ),∆(N3)) is one of the form given in the statement of the lemma. Applying
once again Theorems 8 and 10 completes the proof. ⊓⊔
This finally leads to a way to construct safe instances for the schemes when d = 3
based only on polynomial conditions, via the following steps:
1. Write down a symbolic 4× 3 matrix γ satisfying Precondition 4.1 or Precondition 5.1
according to the constructions of Theorem 12 (resp. Theorem 13), leaving all the xi’s
and yi’s as indeterminates.
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2. Extract all 3×3 matrices from γ that match the form of Lemma 17 and compute their
determinants, which are rational functions in the xis and yis.
3. Factor the numerators of all determinants, removing duplicate factors and factors such
as xi − yi which must be non-zero by construction.
4. A common non-root to the resulting list of polynomials corresponds to a γ matrix
which is safe for the given scheme.
Next we show the results of these computations for each of the two schemes. We used
the Sage [Sag16] computer algebra system to compute the lists of polynomials according
to the procedure above, which takes about 1 second on a modern laptop computer.
Proposition 18. If x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3 ∈ Fq are distinct non-zero elements so that the list
of polynomials in Figure 1 all evaluate to non-zero values, then the matrix γ constructed
according to Theorem 12 generates a safe masking scheme according to Condition 4.1.
From the degrees of these polynomials, and by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80] and
applying the union bound, a safe construction for Condition 4.1 exists over any field Fq
with q > 54.
In fact, we have an explicit construction for any binary field Fq with q ≥ 16.
Theorem 19. Let (x1, x2, x3) = (1, 3, 5) and (y1, y2, y3) = (6, 4, a). Then for any k ≥ 4,
the matrix γ constructed according to Theorem 12 generates a safe masking scheme over
F2k according to Condition 4.1.
Proof. Small cases with 4 ≤ k ≤ 8 are checked computationally by making the appropriate
substitutions into the polynomials of Figure 1.
For k ≥ 9, consider the degrees of the xis and yis when treated as polynomials over
F2. The highest degree is deg y3 = 3, and all other elements have degree at most 2.
Inspecting the polynomials in Figure 1, we see that they are all sums of products of at
most three distinct variables. Therefore, when evaluated at these xis and yis, the degree
of any resulting polynomial is at most 7. Over F2k where k ≥ 8 there is therefore no
reduction, and the polynomials are guaranteed to be non-zero in all cases because they
are non-zero over F28 . ⊓⊔
Next we do the same for the masking scheme with linear randomness, namely that of
Condition 5.1.
Proposition 20. If x1, x2, x3, x4, y1, y2, y3 ∈ Fq are distinct non-zero elements so that the
list of polynomials in Figure 2 all evaluate to non-zero values, then the matrix constructed
according to Theorem 13 generates a safe masking scheme according to Condition 5.1.
Applying the Schwartz-Zippel lemma and union bound in this context guarantees a
safe construction for Condition 5.1 over any field Fq with q > 36. Again, we have an
explicit construction for binary fields of order at least 16.
Theorem 21. Let (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (1, 2, 5, 6) and (y1, y2, y3) = (4, 7, f). Then for any
k ≥ 4, the matrix γ constructed according to Theorem 13 generates a safe masking scheme
over F2k according to Condition 5.1.
The proof is the same as Theorem 19, consisting of computational checks for 4 ≤ k ≤ 8
and then an argument for all k ≥ 9 based on the degrees of the xi and yi polynomials.
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x2x3 − y1y2 − x2y3 − x3y3 + y1y3 + y2y3
x2x3 − x3y1 − x3y2 + y1y2 − x2y3 + x3y3
x2x3 − x2y1 − x2y2 + y1y2 + x2y3 − x3y3
x1x3 − y1y2 − x1y3 − x3y3 + y1y3 + y2y3
x1x3 − x3y1 − x3y2 + y1y2 − x1y3 + x3y3
x1x3 − x1y1 − x1y2 + y1y2 + x1y3 − x3y3
x1x2 − y1y2 − x1y3 − x2y3 + y1y3 + y2y3
x1x2 − x2y1 − x2y2 + y1y2 − x1y3 + x2y3
x1x2 − x1y1 − x1y2 + y1y2 + x1y3 − x2y3
x2y1y2 − x3y1y2 − x2x3y3 + x3y1y3 + x3y2y3 − y1y2y3
x2y1y2 − x3y1y2 + x2x3y3 − x2y1y3 − x2y2y3 + y1y2y3
x1y1y2 − x3y1y2 − x1x3y3 + x3y1y3 + x3y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1y1y2 − x3y1y2 + x1x3y3 − x1y1y3 − x1y2y3 + y1y2y3
x1y1y2 − x2y1y2 − x1x2y3 + x2y1y3 + x2y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1y1y2 − x2y1y2 + x1x2y3 − x1y1y3 − x1y2y3 + y1y2y3
x2x3y1 + x2x3y2 − x2y1y2 − x3y1y2 − x2x3y3 + y1y2y3
x1x3y1 + x1x3y2 − x1y1y2 − x3y1y2 − x1x3y3 + y1y2y3
x1x2y1 + x1x2y2 − x1y1y2 − x2y1y2 − x1x2y3 + y1y2y3
x1x2x3 − x2x3y1 − x2x3y2 − x1y1y2 + x2y1y2 + x3y1y2 − x1x2y3 − x1x3y3 + x2x3y3 + x1y1y3 + x1y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x3 − x1x3y1 − x1x3y2 + x1y1y2 − x2y1y2 + x3y1y2 − x1x2y3 + x1x3y3 − x2x3y3 + x2y1y3 + x2y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x3 − x1x2y1 − x1x2y2 + x1y1y2 + x2y1y2 − x3y1y2 + x1x2y3 − x1x3y3 − x2x3y3 + x3y1y3 + x3y2y3 − y1y2y3
Fig. 1: Polynomials which should be non-zero to generate a safe construction according
to Condition 4.1. There are 9 degree-2 polynomials with 6 terms, 9 degree-3 polynomials
with 6 terms, and 3 degree-3 polynomials with 12 terms.
x2x3x4 − x3x4y1 − x3x4y2 − x2y1y2 + x3y1y2 + x4y1y2 − x2x3y3 − x2x4y3 + x3x4y3 + x2y1y3 + x2y2y3 − y1y2y3
x2x3x4 − x2x4y1 − x2x4y2 + x2y1y2 − x3y1y2 + x4y1y2 − x2x3y3 + x2x4y3 − x3x4y3 + x3y1y3 + x3y2y3 − y1y2y3
x2x3x4 − x2x3y1 − x2x3y2 + x2y1y2 + x3y1y2 − x4y1y2 + x2x3y3 − x2x4y3 − x3x4y3 + x4y1y3 + x4y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x3x4 − x3x4y1 − x3x4y2 − x1y1y2 + x3y1y2 + x4y1y2 − x1x3y3 − x1x4y3 + x3x4y3 + x1y1y3 + x1y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x3x4 − x1x4y1 − x1x4y2 + x1y1y2 − x3y1y2 + x4y1y2 − x1x3y3 + x1x4y3 − x3x4y3 + x3y1y3 + x3y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x3x4 − x1x3y1 − x1x3y2 + x1y1y2 + x3y1y2 − x4y1y2 + x1x3y3 − x1x4y3 − x3x4y3 + x4y1y3 + x4y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x4 − x2x4y1 − x2x4y2 − x1y1y2 + x2y1y2 + x4y1y2 − x1x2y3 − x1x4y3 + x2x4y3 + x1y1y3 + x1y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x4 − x1x4y1 − x1x4y2 + x1y1y2 − x2y1y2 + x4y1y2 − x1x2y3 + x1x4y3 − x2x4y3 + x2y1y3 + x2y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x4 − x1x2y1 − x1x2y2 + x1y1y2 + x2y1y2 − x4y1y2 + x1x2y3 − x1x4y3 − x2x4y3 + x4y1y3 + x4y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x3 − x2x3y1 − x2x3y2 − x1y1y2 + x2y1y2 + x3y1y2 − x1x2y3 − x1x3y3 + x2x3y3 + x1y1y3 + x1y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x3 − x1x3y1 − x1x3y2 + x1y1y2 − x2y1y2 + x3y1y2 − x1x2y3 + x1x3y3 − x2x3y3 + x2y1y3 + x2y2y3 − y1y2y3
x1x2x3 − x1x2y1 − x1x2y2 + x1y1y2 + x2y1y2 − x3y1y2 + x1x2y3 − x1x3y3 − x2x3y3 + x3y1y3 + x3y2y3 − y1y2y3
Fig. 2: Polynomials which should be non-zero to generate a safe construction according to
Condition 5.1. There are 12 degree-3 polynomials with 12 terms each.
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7 Efficient algorithms to test safeness
To test whether a matrix may be used to safely instantiate either of the masking schemes
of Bela¨ıd et al., we use the condition C′(M ′γ ,Nd) defined in (4), which according to
Theorem 8 is a sufficient condition for the scheme under consideration to be safe. The def-
inition of this condition immediately indicates an algorithm, which we have implemented
with some optimizations using M4RIE [Alb13] for the finite field arithmetic.
7.1 The algorithm
To test whether a matrix γ ∈ K(d+1)×d satisfies the conditions of Proposition 6 or Proposition 7,
simply construct M ′γ and Nd and for all d-subsets of columns P ∈ S
ℓ
d , check if Z(NdP ·
kerb(M ′γP )).
This algorithm is much more efficient than the one directly suggested by Condition 4.1:
instead of testing all
∑d
i=1
(
ℓ
i
)
qi vectors of Fℓq of weight d or less, it is enough to do
(
ℓ
d
)
easy linear algebra computations. While this remains exponential in d, it removes the
practically insuperable factor qd and gives a complexity that does not depend on the field
size (save for the cost of arithmetic).
(Note that we could have used the condition C′′ as in Theorem 10 instead, but this
turns out to be more complicated in practice due to the need to take arbitrary subsets of
the rows and columns of M ′γ and Nd.)
We now describe two implementation strategies for this algorithm.
7.2 Straightforward implementation with optimizations
Two simple optimizations may be used to make a straightforward implementation of the
above algorithm more efficient in practice.
Skipping bad column picks. We can see already from the support of Nd that some subsets
of columns P ∈ S ℓd never need to be checked because Z(NdP ) is already true, independent
of the actual choice of γ. This is the case for example when the columns selected by P
are all of weight 1.
For the specific cases of d = 4, this reduces the number of supports to be considered
from
(49
4
)
= 211 876 to 103 030, saving roughly a factor 2. A similar behaviour is observed
for d = 5, when one only has to consider 6 448 239 supports among the
(71
5
)
= 13019 909
possible ones. Note that the same optimization could be applied to the na¨ıve algorithm
that exhaustively enumerates low-weight vectors of Fℓq.
Testing critical cases first. Looking again at how M ′γ is defined, it is easy to see that for
some column selections P , M ′γP does not in fact depend on γ. For these, it is enough
to check once and for all that Z(NγP · kerb(M
′
γP )) indeed holds (if it does not, the
scheme would be generically broken). Going further, even some column subsets such that
MγP actually depends on γ may always be “safe” provided that γ satisfies a certain
precondition, such as for instance being MDS as suggested in Section 5.
Conversely, it may be the case that for some P , Z(NdP · kerb(M
′
γP )) often does
not hold. It may then be beneficial to test this subset P before others that are less
likely to make the condition fail. We have experimentally observed that such subsets do
exist. For instance, in the case d = 5 for Condition 4.1, only ≈ 320 000 column subsets
seem to determine whether a matrix satisfies the condition or not.¶ There, checking these
¶This figure was found experimentally by regrouping the supports in clusters of 10 000, independently
of q. A more careful analysis may lead to a more precise result.
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supports first and using an early-abort strategy, verifying that a matrix does not satisfy
the condition is at least ≈ 20 times faster than enumerating all possible column subsets.
7.3 Batch implementation
Especially when the matrix γ under consideration actually satisfies the required condi-
tions, checking these using the straightforward strategy entails considerable redundant
computation due to the overlap between subsets of columns.
To avoid this, we also implemented a way to check the condition C′(M ′γ ,Nd) that
operates over the entire matrix simultaneously, effectively considering many subsets of
columns in a single batch.
Recall that the algorithm needs to (1) extract a subset of columns ofM ′γ , (2) compute
a right kernel basis for this subset, (3) multiply Nd times this kernel basis, and (4) check
for zero rows in the resulting product.
Steps (2) and (3) would typically be performed via Gaussian elimination: For each
column ofM ′γ that is in the selection, we search for a pivot row, permute rows if necessary
to move the pivot up, then eliminate above and below the pivot and move on. If there is no
pivot in some column, this means a new null vector has been found; we use the previous
pivots to compute the null vector and add it to the basis. Finally, we multiply this null
space basis by the corresponding columns in Nd and check for zero rows.
The key observation for this algorithm is that we can perform these steps (2) and (3)
in parallel to add one more column to an existing column selection. That is, starting with
some subset of columns, we consider the effect on the null space basis and the following
multiplication byNd simultaneously for all other columns in the matrices. Adding columns
with pivots does not change the null space basis or the product withNd. Columns with no
pivots add one additional column to the null space basis, which results in a new column in
the product with Nd. This new column of NdP ·kerb(M
′
γP ) may be checked for non-zero
entries and then immediately discarded as the search continues; in later steps, the rows of
this product which already have a non-zero entry no longer need to be considered.
All of this effectively reduces the cost of the check by a factor of ℓ compared to the
prior version, replacing the search over all size-d subsets with a search over size-(d − 1)
subsets and some matrix computations. This strategy is especially effective when the γ
matrix under consideration is (nearly or actually) safe, meaning that the early termination
techniques above will not be very useful.
8 Experimental results and explicit instantiations
We implemented both algorithms of the previous section in the practically-useful case of
binary fields, using M4RIE for the underlying linear algebra [Alb13], and searched for
matrices fulfilling Conditions 4.1 and 5.1 in various settings, leading to instantiations of
the masking schemes of Bela¨ıd et al. up to d = 6 and F216 .
‖ We also collected statistics
about the fraction of matrices satisfying the conditions, notably in function of the field
over which they are defined. This allows to verify experimentally that Precondition 4 of
Section 5 is useful.
‖
F216 is the largest field size implemented in M4RIE, and d = 6 the maximum dimension for which
safe instantiations (seem to) exist below this field size limitation.
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8.1 Statistics
We give detailed statistics about the proportion of preconditioned matrices allowing to
instantiate either masking scheme up to order 6; this is presented in Tables 1 and 2.
The data was collected by drawing at random matrices satisfying Precondition 4.1 or
Precondition 5.1 and checking if they satisfied the safety conditions or not for the respec-
tive schemes.
For combinations of field size and order where no safe matrix was found, we give the
result as an upper bound.
Notice that the probability for Condition 5.1 appears to be consistently a bit higher
than that for Condition 4.1. The combinations of field size q and order d where safe
instances are found were almost the same for both schemes, except that for order 5 and
q = 29, where a safe preconditioned matrix was found for Condition 5.1 but not for
Condition 4.1. This difference between the schemes can be explained by the fact that
Condition 4.1 places conditions on two matrices γ and 1d×d − γ, whereas Condition 5.1
depends only on the single matrix γ.
An important remark is that for the smallest field F25 , the statistics do not include
results about the non-preconditioned safe matrices, which were the only safe ones we found,
see the further discussion below.
We indicate the sample sizes used to obtain each result, as they may vary by several or-
ders of magnitude due to the exponentially-increasing cost of our algorithm with the order.
As an illustration, our batch implementation is able to check 1 000 000 dimension-4 matri-
ces over F26 in 12 400 seconds on one core of a 2GHz Sandy Bridge CPU, which increases
to 590 000 and 740 000 seconds for F212 and F216 respectively because of more expensive
field operations; 1 600 000 seconds allowed to test ≈ 145 000 and ≈ 25 000 dimension-5
matrices for these last two fields, and ≈ 2 400 dimension-6 matrices for F216 .
Table 1: Instantiations over F25 ∼ F210 . Sample sizes (as indicated by symbols in the
exponents) were as follows: ∗ ≈ 400 000; ‡ = 1000 000; ⋆ ≈ 4 000 000; † ≈ 11 000 000.
q 25 26 27 28 29 210
d Condition 4.1 & Precondition 4.1
4 ≤ 2−28.8 2−15.25† 0.009† 0.11‡ 0.34‡ 0.59‡
5 — — — — ≤ 2−27.5 2−18.9⋆
d Condition 5.1 & Precondition 5.1
4 ≤ 2−33.5 2−9.10‡ 0.062‡ 0.27‡ 0.53‡ 0.73‡
5 — — — — 2−18.6∗ 2−11.0∗
Usefulness of the preconditions. We now address the question of the usefulness of
Preconditions 4.1 and 5.1 of Section 5. Our goal is to determine with what probability
randomly-generated matrices in fact already satisfy the preconditions, and whether doing
so for a matrix γ has a positive impact on its satisfying Condition 4.1 or Condition 5.1.
We did this experimentally for two settings, both for the first scheme corresponding
to Condition 4.1: order d = 4 over F28 and order d = 5 over F213 . We generated enough
random matrices γ in order to obtain respectively 20 000 and 2 000 of them satisfying
Condition 4.1, and counted how many of these corresponding safe pairs (γ, 1d×d − γ)
had at least one or both elements that were MDS and XMDS. The same statistics were
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Table 2: Instantiations over F211 ∼ F216 . Sample sizes (as indicated by symbols in the
exponents) were as follows: ‡ = 1000 000; ∗ ≈ 400 000; ⋄ ≈ 145 000; • ≈ 65 000; ⊳ ≈ 40 000;
⊘ ≈ 30 000; ⋉ ≈ 25 000; ≀ ≈ 560 000; uprise ≈ 12 700.
q 211 212 213 214 215 216
d Condition 4.1 & Precondition 4.1
4 0.77‡ 0.88‡ 0.94‡ 0.97‡ 0.98‡ 0.99‡
5 0.0015∗ 0.04⋄ 0.2• 0.45⊳ 0.67⊘ 0.82⋉
6 — — — — 2−16.8≀ 0.003uprise
d Condition 5.1 & Precondition 5.1
4 0.86‡ 0.92‡ 0.96‡ 0.98‡ 0.99‡ 1.00‡
5 0.021∗ 0.14∗ 0.39∗ 0.62∗ 0.78∗ 0.89∗
6 — — — — 2−12.7⊳ 0.002⊳
gathered for all the generated matrices, including the ones that were not safe. The results
are respectively summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Case d = 4 over F28 , for Condition 4.1.
Total One+ MDS Both MDS One+ XMDS Both XMDS
#Random 672 625 634 096 389 504 515 840 315 273
#Safe 20 000 19 981 19 981 19 981 19 981
Ratio 0.030 0.032 0.051 0.039 0.063
Table 4: Case d = 5 over F213 , for Condition 4.1.
Total One+ MDS Both MDS One+ XMDS Both XMDS
#Random 15 877 15 867 14 978 15 486 14 623
#Safe 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000
Ratio 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
A first comment on the results is that as already remarked in Section 5, the precondi-
tions are not necessary to find safe instantiations. Indeed, for a few of the smallest cases
d = 3, q = 23 and d = 4, q = 25, we were only able to find safe instantiations that did not
meet the preconditions. For example, one can clearly see that the leading 2× 2 submatrix
of the following matrix is singular, and hence the matrix is not MDS:
γ =
4 2 64 2 3
4 2 3
 .
Yet (surprisingly), γ and 1− γ satisfy all requirements of Condition 4.1 over F23 .
Nonetheless, the precondition is clearly helpful in the vast majority of cases. From
our experiments, in cases where any preconditioned safe matrix exists, then nearly all safe
matrices satisfy the precondition, while a significant fraction of random matrices do not.
Enforcing the precondition by construction or as a first check is then indeed a way to
improve the performance of a random search of a safe matrix. This is especially true for
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larger orders; for example, we did not find any safe matrices for order d = 6 over F215 by
random search, but only by imposing Precondition 4.1.
Lastly, one should notice that specifically considering Cauchy matrices seems to further
increase the odds of a matrix being safe, beyond the fact that it satisfies Condition 4.1: in
the case d = 4, F28 , Table 1 gives a success probability of 0.11, which is significantly larger
than the 0.063 of Table 3, and in the case d = 5, F213 , Table 2 gives 0.2, also quite higher
than the 0.14 of Table 4. As of yet, we do not have an explanation for this observation.
8.2 Instantiations of [BBP+17, §4]
We conclude by giving explicit matrices allowing to safely instantiate the scheme of [BBP+17,
§4] over various fields from order 3 up to 6; the case of order at most 2 is treated in Section 6
(Bela¨ıd et al. also provided examples for d = 2). Our examples include practically-relevant
instances with d = 3, 4 over F28 .
We only give one matrix γ for every case we list, but we emphasise that as is required
by the masking scheme, this means that both γ and δ = 1d×d−γ satisfy Condition 4.1. We
list instances only for the smallest field size we know of, and for F28 (when applicable), but
have computed explicit instances for all field sizes up to F216 . The larger-field instantiations
are given in Appendix A.
Instantiations at order 3. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 3 was F23 . Recall that we also have an explicit construction in
Section 6 for any 2k with k ≥ 4.
γ(F23) =
3 5 43 6 7
3 5 4
 γ(F28) =
e3 b7 50bd e8 8b
53 25 a0

Instantiations at order 4. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 4 was F25 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate
the scheme over Fq.
γ(F25) =

1c c 1e b
1c c 1e 12
10 18 17 14
1c c 1e 10
 γ(F28) =

56 5e a1 3d
97 27 71 c7
f5 ae 68 88
1c 3 9c 8e

Instantiations at order 5. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 5 was F210 . The following matrix may be used to instantiate the scheme over F210 .
γ(F210) =

276 13e 64 1ab 120
189 181 195 30f 3fe
20a 3a1 199 30 2db
156 1ab 2f8 e5 2a8
303 321 265 d8 3a

Instantiations at order 6. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 6 was F215 . The following matrix may be used to instantiate the scheme over F215 .
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γ(F215) =

151d 5895 5414 392b 2092 29a6
5c69 2f9e 241d 2ef7 baa 6f40
6e0d 8cf 7ca1 6503 23dc 6b3b
10d7 588e 2c22 1245 6a38 6484
1637 7062 2ae0 d1b 5305 381f
23f6 7d5 21bf 2879 2033 4377

8.3 Instantiations of [BBP+17, §5] up to order 6
We now give similar instantiation results for the scheme with linear randomness complex-
ity. This time, only a single matrix of dimension (d+ 1)× d is necessary to obtain a d-NI
scheme. As in the previous case, we only focus here on the cases where 3 ≤ d ≤ 6, and
only list the matrices over the smallest field we have as well as F28 (where possible). We
refer to the supplementary material for all other cases.
Instantiations at order 3. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 3 was F23 . Recall that we also have an explicit construction in
Section 6 for any 2k with k ≥ 4.
γ(F23) =

1 7 4
4 4 4
2 1 4
7 2 4
 γ(F28) =

da d5 e6
e8 1d 44
ad b3 ce
9f 7b 6c

Instantiations at order 4. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 4 was F25 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate
the scheme over Fq.
γ(F25) =

17 f 13 16
b 7 1a 11
1 1e 19 3
1b 10 2 a
6 6 12 e
 γ(F28) =

ac 39 c0 36
79 5f d9 51
9d 16 ca 63
a3 cb 6 81
eb bb d5 85

Instantiations at order 5. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 5 was F29 . The following matrix may be used to instantiate the scheme over F29 .
γ(F29) =

7d 12c 18 1a3 da
121 131 109 1a7 3b
4a 131 91 a4 1c4
17c cb 14b 41 57
fd 87 ac 17a 149
97 160 67 19b 3b

Instantiations at order 6. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 6 was F215 . The following matrix may be used to instantiate the scheme over F215 .
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γ(F215) =

475c 77e7 64ef 7893 4cd1 6e20
63dd 71f 29da 600e 36be 1db7
5511 d63 3719 4874 664 5014
410e 7cf2 9d9 10a1 7525 6098
7bfe 2998 7e20 1438 35e6 51e
7564 75d3 221a 67c7 56f1 18d5
3e04 5d22 2fcf 33b7 6a39 5ed0

8.4 Minimum field sizes for safe instantiations
We conclude by briefly comparing the minimum field sizes for which we could find safe in-
stantiations of Condition 4.1 and Condition 5.1 with the ones given by the non-constructive
existence theorems of Bela¨ıd et al.. Namely, [BBP+17, Thm. 4.5] guarantees the existence
of a pair of safe matrices for Condition 4.1 in dimension d over Fq as long as q > 2d·(12d)
d ,
and [BBP+17, Thm. 5.4] of a safe matrix for Condition 5.1 as long as q > d ·(d+1) ·(12d)d .
We give in Table 5 the explicit values provided by these two theorems for 2 ≤ d ≤ 6 and q
a power of two, along with the experimental minima that we found. From these, it seems
that the sufficient condition of Bela¨ıd et al. is in fact rather pessimistic.
Table 5: Sufficient field sizes for safe instantiations in characteristic two. Sizes are given
as log(q).
d / min(log(q)) [BBP+17, Thm. 4.5] Section 8.2 [BBP+17, Thm. 5.4] Section 8.3
2 11 3 12 3
3 19 3 20 3
4 26 5 27 5
5 33 10 35 9
6 41 15 43 15
]
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A Explicit instantiations of schemes
We provide a complete listing of the safe γ matrices we have computed for both masking
schemes.
A.1 Instantiations of [BBP+17, §4]
Instantiations at order 3. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 3 was F23 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate
the scheme over Fq.
γ(F23) =
3 5 43 6 7
3 5 4
 γ(F24) =
4 b ef 7 5
3 d c
 γ(F25) =
15 8 14f 1d c
16 7 5
 γ(F26) =
36 30 1d21 5 1a
35 31 1b

γ(F27) =
7b 5a 1164 5b 60
42 72 79
 γ(F28) =
e3 b7 50bd e8 8b
53 25 a0
 γ(F29) =
 c4 149 8c112 167 5d
da 110 13b

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γ(F210) =
39f 2e4 2a967 25a 63
93 1d2 34a
 γ(F211) =
462 60 14b3d5 3ce 1ab
22 223 11c
 γ(F212) =
7ef 7a e063c9 be9 ca8
a7d 8b9 14d

γ(F213) =
720 cff 1871786 1596 37f
8bf 155e 8fc
 γ(F214) =
3c30 2f24 723244b 3452 295c
1572 2682 1c92

γ(F215) =
4bf5 39c5 392969 3f99 220e
40ad 7285 4538
 γ(F216) =
5ba1 264b 288d51c f2f7 43cb
22b0 ea98 4ddc

Instantiations at order 4. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 4 was F25 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate
the scheme over Fq.
γ(F25) =

1c c 1e b
1c c 1e 12
10 18 17 14
1c c 1e 10
 γ(F26) =

26 1b 8 3f
14 6 1e 2c
13 2a 33 22
3c 10 14 28

γ(F27) =

e 6e 60 3d
51 27 6d 46
1d 21 43 13
48 2e 76 16
 γ(F28) =

56 5e a1 3d
97 27 71 c7
f5 ae 68 88
1c 3 9c 8e

γ(F29) =

1b8 30 1cf c
fa 11d f 16f
8f 56 60 17f
104 ec 100 17e
 γ(F210) =

23a ea 11b 16d
9 3e2 387 197
2c4 148 296 1fc
14c 2c3 117 355

γ(F211) =

36c 27a 32f 73
3bd 39d 610 254
3b1 27c 33a 3e4
42c 3f1 723 142
 γ(F212) =

f19 ef4 16f 6b7
cfc 71c b5d f69
d23 440 b39 1e8
915 5c0 526 882

γ(F213) =

4bf 559 1ef 2f2
d75 1154 fec a68
a34 ce6 41c e99
1941 18a0 b83 17ae
 γ(F214) =

aa9 3b79 309e 258f
1711 1e67 1f6b 192b
ecb 3c84 1cba da9
3b47 772 5cd 38c8

γ(F215) =

2251 11d0 605a 63e6
7f22 68e6 ed7 6bb7
487f 6fcf 5c3f 23ee
3b25 7289 19c4 50d4
 γ(F216) =

4b5f 758b ed70 40a2
9d32 f21 6ca6 388e
8691 f39a 6def 860f
6576 897d 5020 b398

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Instantiations at order 5. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 5 was F210 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate the scheme
over Fq.
γ(F210) =

276 13e 64 1ab 120
189 181 195 30f 3fe
20a 3a1 199 30 2db
156 1ab 2f8 e5 2a8
303 321 265 d8 3a
 γ(F211) =

19d 57f 5b8 148 473
45f 176 517 1c9 2f7
171 699 41d 18e 5cb
6fe af 7a4 100 47d
482 181 441 44a 793

γ(F212) =

866 440 a83 a02 b05
d77 449 a38 bd1 554
5b3 84a a09 90c c64
25e c5f d45 445 aa5
b56 5ac 4af aa3 193
 γ(F213) =

559 1ef 2f2 7c4 755
1154 fec a68 19f7 1c3b
ce6 41c e99 10fc 1fda
18a0 b83 17ae 8bd f35
c98 8fc efb 1200 14ae

γ(F214) =

1ded 346c 2bc3 10d8 12be
2b47 3638 2032 3386 18f6
1a5 269a 70c 7e7 1c07
34bf 2462 8cf 1bd5 3941
3aef 3699 1faf cb2 3c41
 γ(F215) =

3d33 3494 6bae 5d57 79e4
627a 1dd e95 3f5b 134c
a03 4087 b8c 31f0 75e8
4930 531b 4f33 2e8f 1a4c
1103 3dde 2834 1853 4754

γ(F216) =

758b ed70 40a2 f1c7 9b8c
f21 6ca6 388e c9c9 1b09
f39a 6def 860f d582 1cc3
897d 5020 b398 234b 2598
a9ea f2ee c8f3 1f04 ba18

Instantiations at order 6. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 6 was F215 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate the scheme
over Fq.
γ(F215) =

151d 5895 5414 392b 2092 29a6
5c69 2f9e 241d 2ef7 baa 6f40
6e0d 8cf 7ca1 6503 23dc 6b3b
10d7 588e 2c22 1245 6a38 6484
1637 7062 2ae0 d1b 5305 381f
23f6 7d5 21bf 2879 2033 4377

γ(F216) =

9f80 97e3 1a0a 2dbf 93e7 c7a8
9dcf 3e14 d5d ec34 2375 28d6
4ee9 2f79 1bdd 1389 3f17 8803
1667 2d1f d4ea d573 49f6 697f
5877 2c2d 995d a867 64e6 e758
e58c c5a8 18cb b3cd a42b 722b

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A.2 Instantiations of [BBP+17, §5]
Instantiations at order 3. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 3 was F23 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate
the scheme over Fq.
γ(F23) =

1 7 4
4 4 4
2 1 4
7 2 4
 γ(F24) =

9 a 6
f 6 9
5 1 6
3 d 9
 γ(F25) =

1b 9 4
5 13 1e
e 1f 18
10 5 2
 γ(F26) =

c 25 3d
3f 2e 2c
24 d 7
17 6 16

γ(F27) =

17 3c 1e
21 15 4e
35 14 16
3 3d 46
 γ(F28) =

da d5 e6
e8 1d 44
ad b3 ce
9f 7b 6c
 γ(F29) =

14b bd f6
62 4d 1b4
1a 124 18f
133 1d4 cd

γ(F210) =

78 25b 97
35c ae 328
14c 292 d2
268 67 36d
 γ(F211) =

111 1a5 50f
7c4 443 5a
697 76e 53b
42 288 6e
 γ(F212) =

91f 7b0 4c2
ad6 a47 7e3
743 3c4 c8
48a e33 3e9

γ(F213) =

1385 fc8 153f
173d 1920 113a
40a 1b0 423
b2 1758 26
 γ(F214) =

3795 38e8 14fa
268a df7 27a2
259 359e 3cfe
1346 81 fa6

γ(F215) =

1852 689 305d
320d 33a4 3aaf
7873 4270 46d4
522c 775d 4c26
 γ(F216) =

4f70 6517 a398
e7a8 9d98 5b74
e251 3130 6ebf
4a89 c9bf 9653

Instantiations at order 4. The smallest (binary) field for which we could find an
instantiation at order 4 was F25 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate
the scheme over Fq.
γ(F25) =

17 f 13 16
b 7 1a 11
1 1e 19 3
1b 10 2 a
6 6 12 e
 γ(F26) =

f 2f 20 25
1c 28 6 25
32 2c 9 8
26 28 11 13
7 3 3e 1b

γ(F27) =

7f 14 50 5f
35 58 45 6b
24 60 5e 2e
11 1e 2d 7b
7f 32 66 61
 γ(F28) =

ac 39 c0 36
79 5f d9 51
9d 16 ca 63
a3 cb 6 81
eb bb d5 85

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γ(F29) =

3e 1e0 5 1ef
e 19 180 c4
93 186 d9 98
82 49 36 191
21 36 16a 22
 γ(F210) =

ad 244 388 1d3
7a 253 32 3d4
b2 370 128 1cc
41 b7 2c0 390
24 3d0 52 5b

γ(F211) =

6a7 e6 ee 5c
13d 29e 781 7cd
225 75a 534 25b
25a 364 479 37d
7e5 646 622 6b7
 γ(F212) =

4db 48a 5b9 83e
f2e 616 941 725
58a b17 543 3e
6c 243 caf aab
e13 bc8 514 58e

γ(F213) =

fa9 50f 1f87 a97
181e 1cf 1725 86c
e22 8eb 1800 118d
168f e76 1f81 e8d
f1a 25d f23 1dfb
 γ(F214) =

261d ff 1fcb ae1
4f8 3575 1be2 ea6
139a 3353 3ca8 116c
2d98 1eb9 9d7 3fad
1ce7 1860 3156 2a86

γ(F215) =

246d 79de 632b 2b2f
1fe9 3986 13da 6a77
4e15 6f28 4e9a 2778
5389 6a45 7849 7770
2618 4535 4622 1150
 γ(F216) =

dfd3 a0b4 ca3b 39bb
b92f f0a7 b829 bf8d
ae71 3990 7757 3943
5bd5 f925 188 af4f
9358 90a6 4cd 103a

Instantiations at order 5. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 5 was F29 . The following matrices γ(Fq) may be used to instantiate the scheme
over Fq.
γ(F29) =

7d 12c 18 1a3 da
121 131 109 1a7 3b
4a 131 91 a4 1c4
17c cb 14b 41 57
fd 87 ac 17a 149
97 160 67 19b 3b
 γ(F210) =

33 314 2b6 4d 236
285 339 8a 3bb 79
56 118 b6 373 326
132 1b5 2cd 7 335
72 d4 101 26e 10e
3a0 54 146 2ec 352

γ(F211) =

1ce d9 5d5 690 6ae
176 7fa 44e 559 a2
3e2 532 c9 7a 447
4f1 4d 64b 36 65
bc 26d 1cc 645 84
717 31 6d5 5c0 2aa
 γ(F212) =

8ef 276 61a b58 2ab
d02 63 871 61 cb8
4da d8 ced 3f5 ce6
bc3 d44 c82 1a c2a
c6 125 ed3 9fc 906
a32 eac d7 12a 7d9

γ(F213) =

89a 1c76 e56 ae5 a19
14c4 20c 198 13f1 886
6bf e58 1ed8 1ae3 19fb
519 1171 1c43 10e7 f50
fd5 13de c24 1f01 1a9d
102d 128d 171 c11 ea9
 γ(F214) =

1d03 3719 39b0 3a21 3598
550 82a 3f3f 2aba 35cb
3f2f 3a81 1109 37f0 2175
23c2 194a dc6 3fa3 29a4
3e3f 571 23c6 31ee 3c23
3a81 1989 3986 2926 34a1

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γ(F215) =

2bd 662d 3f88 5519 6e67
4519 71cc 44a5 102c 3f61
313c 160f 131b 6695 4631
2c83 53b7 1b64 504b dd1
4733 1baa 11a4 b15 46ff
1d28 49f3 62f6 78fe 5c19
γ(F216) =

f4ff 3efb b917 5dab c491
9179 d251 abbd 544d 426b
3242 e774 cc82 2de0 55
d5e 2439 28ca 539f c5ab
9659 1cbc 7431 2eae f356
ccc3 335b 82d3 5937 b052

Instantiations at order 6. The smallest field for which we could find an instantiation
at order 6 was F215 . The following matrices may be used to instantiate the scheme over
Fq.
γ(F215) =

475c 77e7 64ef 7893 4cd1 6e20
63dd 71f 29da 600e 36be 1db7
5511 d63 3719 4874 664 5014
410e 7cf2 9d9 10a1 7525 6098
7bfe 2998 7e20 1438 35e6 51e
7564 75d3 221a 67c7 56f1 18d5
3e04 5d22 2fcf 33b7 6a39 5ed0

γ(F216) =

d997 8a77 f6eb b902 a02d f8f6
a7b9 239c c977 8270 7b14 34a8
571c bc5c 539b c981 16a4 ff58
9417 b095 f080 e399 d925 687b
5f28 6048 cf5a 1158 2db9 b4e1
8ae1 75e7 fb1c 77e9 22ec 74fb
68ec b08d a8c1 77db 1bed 9b67

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